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Abstract— Open-Source Projects and Libraries are being
used in software development while also bearing multiple secu-
rity vulnerabilities. This use of third party ecosystem creates a
new kind of attack surface for a product in development. An
intelligent attacker can attack a product by exploiting one of
the vulnerabilities present in linked projects and libraries.
In this paper, we mine threat intelligence about open source
projects and libraries from bugs and issues reported on
public code repositories. We also track library and project
dependencies for installed software on a client machine. We
represent and store this threat intelligence, along with the
software dependencies in a security knowledge graph. Security
analysts and developers can then query and receive alerts from
the knowledge graph if any threat intelligence is found about
linked libraries and projects, utilized in their products.
Index Terms— Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Threat
Intelligence, Open Source Projects, Intelligence Acquisition
I. INTRODUCTION
In the normal course of software development, developers
and coders rely on various open source projects and libraries.
Open source projects and libraries comprise of source code
that is open for anyone to inspect, modify, update or enhance
[17]. This type of programming embraces innovative ideas of
collaboration, open exchange, transparency, and community-
oriented development. Software developers and programmers
are then able to access this source code easily and add their
input of code or fix parts that may not function as intended.
This is much different from “proprietary” or “closed source”
software which only allows access and modifications from
the person, group, or organization that own it. Also, closed
source software requires users to sign a license and accept
the terms placed under it by the originators which differs
drastically from legal terms of open source software [25].
The design of open source projects and their licenses encour-
ages all computer programmers to access public projects and
collectively make edits however they find fit.
This use of third party ecosystem creates a new kind of
attack surface for the product in development. The developers
link these products and code libraries with little consideration
of threats, vulnerabilities, and exposures present in them. It is
estimated that about 70-80% of source code implemented in
current day projects are from open source communities [25].
The abundance of open source projects also increases the
need to track security vulnerabilities and bugs that are present
within the libraries they are linked to. Such security vulnera-
bilities are then inherited by the product in development. An
intelligent attacker can then attack the product by exploiting
one of these vulnerabilities. The problem gets more complex
with the number of recorded open source vulnerabilities each
year [17]. Another problem that even compounds the issue is
the fact that the open source libraries linked by a developer
can themselves link to other vulnerable libraries and so on.
A vulnerability present in any of these can cause a domino
effect, resulting in the product being developed inheriting a
vulnerability.
A recent case would be the exploitation by hackers on
an open source security vulnerability within Equifax’s, a
U.S. based credit rating bureau, database during July -
August 2017 [17]. In this attack, it was reported that hackers
attacked Equifax by exploiting a web applications vulner-
ability to access private files of customers. The reported
breach stemmed from the popular open source programming
framework that Equifax utilized for their web applications
known as Apache Struts [17]. The Apache Struts framework
included a critical vulnerability that allowed easy access
for hackers to Equifax’s database. Names, social security
numbers, birth dates, addresses, and drivers license numbers
from an estimated 143 million customers were compro-
mised [17]. Equifax is not alone in the sense that other
companies also have implemented known vulnerable open
source components into their organization and products.
This implementation of open source software with persistent
vulnerabilities is a growing concern for software developers.
In order to better protect the product in development,
it is necessary to create a repository of known vulnera-
bilities in these open source libraries and projects. Threat
intelligence about some of these projects can be mined
using traditional sources like NIST’s National Vulnerabil-
ity Database (NVD)1, United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT)2, etc. Other sources which are
more non-traditional are, Twitter, Reddit, blogs, and news.
Non-traditional sources are faster than the traditional ones.
There is a significant gap between initial vulnerability an-
nouncement and NVD release [19]. Vulnerability threat intel-
ligence appears first on non-traditional sources [18]. Mining
non-traditional sources is becoming really important. In our
previous work, we have developed CyberTwitter [13] and
Cyber-All-Intel [14] systems that mines threat intelligence
1https://nvd.nist.gov/
2https://www.us-cert.gov/
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from various OSINT sources. The systems then represent
cybersecurity intelligence in knowledge graphs and vector
spaces so it can be used by artificial intelligence based cyber-
defense systems.
In this paper, we propose a ‘shift-left’ [11] form of
security. We create a system that will inform a developer
about potential threats and vulnerabilities that the product in
development might inherit as a result of linking to a vulnera-
ble open source project or library. We mine threat intelligence
from issues and bugs raised on web-based hosting service for
version control like, GitHub [3], GitLab [4], bitbucket [1],
etc. These platforms have been used by developers to host
and collaborate on source code development [5]. We extract
vulnerabilities raised on these platforms and represent them
in a security knowledge graph. The knowledge graph then
becomes a store for various vulnerabilities and exposures
present in various open source projects, products and libraries
(see Figure 1). This knowledge can then be queried by vari-
ous developers helping them create products that are secure
from the ground up. Pervasive software security entails cyber
supply chain risk management, where the developers are
made aware of various threats present in libraries they link
with the development of their products.
We also create another application that can track installed
software on a client machine, and then use the above
mentioned knowledge graph to reason alerts for the security
analyst. These alerts warn the analyst if an installed software
is linked to a vulnerable open source library or project. We
built a proof of concept for this application that runs on a
linux installation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows - Section
II discusses some of our related work. Our methodology is
presented in Section III. We discuss our experimental setup
and evaluation in Section IV. We conclude in Section V.
Fig. 1. Mining threat intelligence from bug and issue reports. Intelligence
is stored in a Security Knowledge Graph. The graph represents the threat
intelligence: “I’ve noticed a buffer overflow in the Unix version of LightFTP
v1.1”
II. RELATED WORK
A. Open Source Software Security
Open source development has created a variety of new
software security challenges. Closed source proponents claim
that the availability of open source software’s code allows
hackers to easily find a way to compromise the security. They
believe that “hackers finding the source code and placing
back doors for unauthorized access to their systems is one of
the biggest limiting factors for open source software” [10].
Closed source systems based on the principle of security
through obscurity, may have theoretical or actual security
vulnerabilities, but its owners or designers believe that they
are more secure if the flaws are not known.
Security of open source systems stems from the Kerck-
hoffs’s Law (sometimes refereed to as Shannon’s maxim),
which states that ”A cryptosystem should be designed to
be secure if everything is known about it except the key
information.” [21]. The strength behind open source software
stems from it’s wide audience looking at the code and
collectively finding problems. In our work, we are interested
in gathering threat intelligence about issue and vulnerability
reports in open source repositories from project contributors.
B. Mining Threat Intelligence
The production of new computer systems and software
has always attracted the likes of cyber criminals who have
compromised such technology through hacking or infecting
with viruses and/or malware. Their objectives can range
from shutdown of a website, data breaches, acts of fraud, or
distribution of viruses. However, understanding the volume
of these cyber attacks and all the broad spectrum of vectors
in which they occur greatly aids cyber security professionals
effort to create cyber-defense strategies. The exponential
growth of hacking communities among the web also means
that security professionals also gain an exponential amount
of threat intelligence from those communities and are tasked
with a challenge to monitor their behavior. The threat intel-
ligence that comes from these communities can be forums
consisting of numerous members, posts, or threads that re-
quire constant filtering and mining for security vulnerabilities
[11].
The use of semantic knowledge graphs in cybersecurity
has gained traction in the past few years. Considerable atten-
tion has been dedicated to develop techniques for extracting
concepts related to security vulnerabilities, affected software,
hardware, and organizations and generating its semantic
representation [16][8][22][13][14]. While previous research
focused on sources such as NVD, social media, and security
blogs, our work is applied to bug and issue reports taken
from public code repositories, where the content is different
from other sources.
C. Knowledge Graph systems for Threat Intelligence
Effective strategies to precisely counter cyber attacks relies
heavily on the detection of future threats, attacker’s behavior,
and accessibility of threat intelligence. Being able to attain
cyber threat intelligence will eliminate the possibility of
vulnerabilities being exploited and improves the ability to
react to future attacks [7].
Knowledge graphs for cybersecurity have been used by [9]
to create association and combination of data and information
from multiple sources. Takahashi et al. [24], [23] built an
ontology for cybersecurity operational information based on
actual cybersecurity operations mainly focused on cloud
computing-based services. Rutkowski et al. [20] created a
cybersecurity information exchange framework, known as
CYBEX. Another insightful work by Xie et al. [26] discusses
uncertainty modeling for cyber security centered around near
real-time security analysis such as intrusion response.
Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) help
by examining signature markings of cyber infrastructure
for malicious activity and generating alerts. These systems
however cannot detect malicious activity if the systems do
not already have that signature in their databases [13], [15].
Also, these systems are point source solutions and can-
not organize threat intelligence coming from heterogeneous
sources. Cyber research has focused on combining traditional
signature based intrusion detection with ontological reason-
ing to further improve knowledge graphs. This allows for the
interpretation of means and consequences for links between
cyber threats and vulnerabilities whose signatures are not yet
in the databases.
III. METHODOLOGY
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Fig. 2. Knowledge Graph with ontology of projects and threat intelligence.
In this section, we will describe our system architecture
(see Figure 2). Our system has a two subparts. The first
part tracks repositories of various open source projects and
libraries. It monitors various issues and bugs reported on
these repositories and filters out all security related issues
that mention vulnerabilities, threats, etc. It then converts
this intelligence into a machine readable format. The second
part tracks software running on a machine and identifies
all libraries and dependencies. Both parts feed the collected
information to a common security knowledge graph.
Once the security knowledge graph gets populated, a
system administrator or a developer can use a query engine
and an alert generation system to find vulnerable projects
and libraries. We now describe each of the different subparts
and applications in detail:
A. Initializing a Security Knowledge Graph
Our knowledge graph consists of vulnerabilities, threats
found on open source projects, library repositories, and
installed software with their dependencies. For our knowl-
edge graph we used the Unified Cybersecurity Ontology
(UCO) [22] to provide cybersecurity domain knowledge.
An Intelligence ontology [13] was used to represent threat
intelligence. We also created a software dependency ontology
that helps represent installed software and its dependencies
(see Section III-B). In our system, we also matched entities
of various softwares and libraries that we encounter to their
DBpedia [6] equivalent entities. For example the installed
software vlc is matched to dbr:VLC media player, this helps
us retrieve more global information like, developer, genre,
operating system, etc. about a particular software.
B. Tracking Installed Software & Mining Library Linking
To track and generate alerts for all software that inherits
vulnerabilities from open source dependencies, we compiled
the knowledge of all installed software on a machine and
its dependencies. We obtained all of the software programs
already installed on a machine and then for each program
we listed all of the library dependencies and environment
variables. The environment variables helped us identify open
source projects that are utilized by a particular installed
software. In order to create a proof of concept, we focused
on a linux installation. We utilized the objdump3 tool to
disassemble installed software and trace dependencies. Once
we obtained the information we asserted it in our security
knowledge graph mentioned in Section III-A, using the
software dependency ontology.
An abstract view of the software dependency ontology is
show in Figure 3. The software class is divided into three
sub classes which are the project, product, and library. The
product class represents installed software on a machine. A
product utilizes a project, and is linked to a library.
Fig. 3. Software Dependency Ontology Schema.
C. Bug & Issue Tracking
So as to mine active threat intelligence for various open
source projects and libraries, we collected bug reports and
issues posted by developers on code repositories. We then
asserted the information in our security knowledge graph (see
Section III-D). Figure 5, shows a vulnerability in a popular
FTP client for Unix. For our system, as a proof of concept,
we have developed a crawler and tracker to collect threat
intelligence from repositories hosted on GitHub [3]. We
utilized GitHub’s Rest API to collect and track open issues,
closed issues, and pull requests from a project repository.
3https://linux.die.net/man/1/objdump
@prefix uco: <http://accl.umbc.edu/ns/ontology/uco#> .
@prefix soft: <http://accl.umbc.edu/ns/ontology/software#> .
@prefix rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> .
@prefix rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> .
@prefix xml: <http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace> .
@prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> .
@prefix dbp: <http://dbpedia.org/resource#> .
@prefix owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#> .
</usr/bin/python3.6> a soft:Product ;
soft:Is Linked To <libutil.so.1> ;
soft:Is Linked To <libpython3.6m.so.1.0> ;
soft:Is Linked To <libm.so.6> ;
soft:Is Linked To <libdl.so.2> ;
soft:Is Linked To <libpthread.so.0> ;
soft:Is Linked To <libc.so.6> .
<libutil.so.1> a soft:Library .
<libpython3.6m.so.1.0> a soft:Library .
<libm.so.6> a soft:Library .
<libdl.so.2> a soft:Library .
<libpthread.so.0> a soft:Library .
<libc.so.6> a soft:Library .
Fig. 4. RDF for libraries linked by the program Python 3.6.
Fig. 5. Sample issue showing security buffer overflow in a popular Unix
FTP client.
We retrieved all the issues present in multiple project
repositories in JSON format and stored them in data frames.
The resulting data frames for each project were then filtered
to remove any non-security related issues. We extracted is-
sues that consisted of terms related to security vulnerabilities
using a Security Vulnerability Concept Extractor (SVCE)
[13]. The SVCE is able to tag every sentence with the
following concepts: Means of an attack, Consequence of
an attack, affected software, hardware and operating system,
version numbers, network related terms, file names and other
technical terms.
SVCE discards all issues for which it fails to identify
at-least two security concept, thus further removing non-
security related data. The extracted concepts are also used to
generate an RDF Linked Data representation for every issue
that may be queried by security systems to protect against
potential attacks.
D. Asserting Threat Intelligence
Once the SVCE identifies security concepts and entities.
We then associated them with Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs). These URIs are then converted to nodes in our
security knowledge graph. We used the Unified Cybersecu-
rity Ontology [22] which integrates heterogeneous data and
knowledge schemas from different cybersecurity systems and
standards.
We used DBpedia to link various knowledge graph nodes
to real world concepts. Entity matching process is performed
by using DBpedia [6] and DBpedia spotlight [12]. For
example we can use DBpedia to map the string “Adobe
Flash” to dbr:Adobe Flash. This external knowledge graph
help us map our entities to real world conceptual instances.
After entity linking, we stored the linked data as RDF
triples in our security knowledge graph. In our system we
need information of cybersecurity intelligence. Threat intel-
ligence is temporal in nature and may contain other meta-
data like, origin, credibility, provenance, etc. UCO though
gives us a domain overview of cybersecurity it cannot handle
temporal nature of events. So as to handle time in events we
use the intelligence ontology [13].
To give an example, Figure 6 shows the RDF statements
created for the intelligence “I’ve noticed a buffer overflow in
the Unix version of LightFTP v1.1” (Figure 5). A graphical
representation of the same intelligence, Int2362704296 has
been shown in Figure 1. Once we obtain the intelligence in
the RDF format, we use it to create the alert and the query
system.
@prefix uco: <http://accl.umbc.edu/ns/ontology/uco#> .
@prefix intel: <http://accl.umbc.edu/ns/ontology/intelligence#> .
@prefix rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> .
@prefix rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> .
@prefix xml: <http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace> .
@prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> .
@prefix dbp: <http://dbpedia.org/resource#> .
@prefix owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#> .
<Int2362704296> a intel:Intelligence ;
intel:hasVulnerability <buffer overflow> .
<LightFTP> a uco:Product ;
uco:hasVulnerability <buffer overflow> ;
owl:sameAs dbp:FTP-server .
<buffer overflow> a uco:Vulnerability ;
uco:affectsProduct <LightFTP> ;
owl:sameAs dbp:buffer overflow .
Fig. 6. RDF for textual input “I’ve noticed a buffer overflow in the Unix
version of LightFTP v1.1”. Also, owl : sameAs property has been used
to augment the data using an external source ‘DBpedia’ [6].
E. Applications
Once we populated our security knowledge graph with the
information about installed software and linked dependencies
(see Section III-B) and also add, threat intelligence mined
from issues and bug reports (Section III-D), we utilized it to
create an alert generation system and a query system.
1) Query System: The developer before linking to an open
source library or using a project should be able to query the
security knowledge graph to check for known vulnerabilities.
We have created a SPARQL4 endpoint that can accept queries
which run on our knowledge graph. An example query to list
all vulnerabilities in LightFTP:
SELECT ?y WHERE {
?LightFTP <hasVulnerability> ?y .
}
An example query to look up vulnerabilities in linked
libraries to the installed application firefox:
SELECT ?x WHERE {
?firefox <Is_Linked_to> ?z
?z <hasVulnerability> ?x.
}
2) Alert Generation System: The system will reason on
our security knowledge graph and generate alerts. In our
system we include SWRL rules5 so as to generate alerts.
SWRL rules contain two parts, antecedent part (body),
and a consequent (head). The body and head consist of
conjunctions of a set of atoms. Informally, a rule may be
read as meaning that if the antecedent holds (is true), then
the consequent must also hold. For our system we see two
potential alert scenarios:
1) A developer is linking to a library or a project with
known vulnerabilities and threats: The system will take
in all the libraries that a developer wants to use and
then trigger an alert if it finds a vulnerability or threat
in any one of these libraries. We see this as a developer
initiated scenario.
Our alert system also checks other linked libraries that
link to the ones mentioned by the developer. Some
example rules included in our system:
Rule for vulnerable project utilization:
Product(?x)ˆ Utilizes(?x, ?y)ˆ
hasVulnerability(?y, ?z)
==> RaiseAlert(?x,"Yes")
Rule for linked library vulnerability
check:
Product(?x)ˆ Is_Linked_To(?x, ?y)ˆ
hasVulnerability(?y, ?z)
==> RaiseAlert(?x,"Yes")
Rule for secondary linked library
vulnerability check:
Product(?x)ˆ Is_Linked_To(?x, ?y)ˆ
Is_Linked_To(?y, ?z)ˆ
hasVulnerability(?z, ?u)
==> RaiseAlert(?x,"Yes")
4https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-sparql-query/
5https://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/
The rules raise an alert if any vulnerability or threat
is found in linked libraries and projects. For the first
rule above ‘Rule for vulnerable project utilization’,
given a product node ?x, the rules check for edge:
Utilizes(?x, ?y), to hop to the graph node ?y. Once
at ?y it checks for the edge: hasV ulnerability(?y, ?z)
to hop to node ?z. If the above node exists an alert is
generated. A similar technique is used to evaluate other
rules mentioned above.
2) An installed application on a client machine is linked
to compromised dependencies: This is an information
triggered alert, where influx of new threat intelligence
warrants a lookup for vulnerable installed software.
The system should automatically inform a security
analyst that an installed application on a client machine
is vulnerable. An example rule for this alert:
Rule for vulnerable libraries:
Library(?x)ˆ hasVulnerability(?x, ?y)ˆ
Is_Linked_To(?z, ?x)
==> RaiseAlert(?z,"Yes")
Rule for vulnerable projects:
Project(?x)ˆ hasVulnerability(?x, ?y)ˆ
Utilizes(?z, ?x)
==> RaiseAlert(?z,"Yes")
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP & EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the system and collect empirical
data we ran our system under experimental conditions. The
system was run on a Ubuntu6 Linux installation with 81
installed programs, some of these were pre-installed. We
extracted the library and project dependencies for these 81
installed programs and represent this information in our
security knowledge graph (see Section III-B). Figure 4,
shows the triples generated for a popular installed software.
We collected 110,800 issues posted on GitHub [3], using
the GitHub Rest API. For our experiments and to create
a valid proof of concept, we limit issue collection to the
GitHub repositories for the 81 installed projects. We also use
only the issues posted after January 2018 in our analysis. Out
of the 110,800 issues collected our SVCE (see Section III-C)
filtered 9,194 security issues. We then assert these security
vulnerabilities in our knowledge graph (see Section III-D).
Figure 6, lists triples generated for a popular FTP client.
We performed an initial evaluation of our prototype system
using the bug-reports collected. We evaluate the quality of
the tags generated by the SVCE module, and how often
our system missed intelligence because it discarded relevant
details. We did not evaluate our entity matching process
as it was done through DBpedia APIs. Human assessments
and annotation was done by students familiar with the
cybersecurity domain.
For our first evaluation measure we check the quality
of tags generated by our SVCE module. We tagged 150
6https://www.ubuntu.com/
randomly selected security issues and then manually checked
the tags. The annotators had to evaluate if the SVCE output
was correct, partially correct or wrong. Our annotators agreed
on the fact that 98 issues were marked correctly by the SVCE
module and out of the remaining 52 issues, 18 were tagged
completely wrong and the remaining were tagged partially
correct. The annotators were then asked to look into the alerts
generated for the 98 issues correctly identified, the system
raised appropriate alerts for each.
We evaluated the loss of intelligence because of discarded
issues, i.e., those not included in the dataset of 9,194 security
issues. A random sample of 200 issues was generated from
the discarded issues. In these, our annotators found 9 issues
with actionable security related information. We believe that
these were wrongfully tagged by our SVCE module because
of spelling mistakes, unidentifiable characters, informal slang
expressions, non-English words, etc.
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we described our method for mining threat
intelligence about open-source projects and libraries from
host repository issues and bug reports. We collected bug
reports consisting of all reported issues from multiple open
source repositories on Github with Github’s Rest API. Then,
we extracted all the issues that had information related to
cybersecurity. These security issues were then stored into
our knowledge graph as RDF triples. We also track library
and project dependencies for installed software on a client
machine. The library dependencies with their correspond-
ing applications are stored as RDF triples in the security
knowledge graph. The knowledge graph was then used to
create an alert and query system that can warn users of
security vulnerabilities. Security analysts and developers can
then query and receive alerts from the knowledge graph if
any threat intelligence is found about linked libraries and
projects, utilized in their products. The system can also issue
alerts, about installed libraries, if new vulnerabilities are
disclosed on these code repositories.
For future work, we will like to mine threat intelligence
from other web services, such as GitLab [4], Code Triage
[2], etc, as they will also contain information about open-
source projects with security vulnerabilities. These different
code repositories host different projects which can serve
as vital sources of threat intelligence. This variety would
further improve our system and add more information to our
knowledge graph. We would also like to investigate other
knowledge representation techniques that can be used to
store threat intelligence. Using multiple representations like
vector space embeddings, can further improve the quality of
applications built to utilize them.
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